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IN THE SUPR£1.1E COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT P. NORRIS and
& AYERS REAL ESTATE,

GU~?
I~C.,

Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 15660

JOHN PRICE ASSOCIATES, IC;C
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents brought an action for breach of
contract, to recover

co~"issions

sulting from the lease of

due from ap?ellant re-

ap~ellant's

office building to

IBI-1 Corporation.
DISPOSITIO:'l IN THE LOII'ER COURT
This case was tried to a jury on December 12
and 13, 1977.
pJ~intiffs

The jury returned a verdict in favor of

and damages werP determined by the court,

tlH'Y rwing merely a

r~:Jtter

of :Jrithmetic cor?utation.

The court entered judc;rr.ent on the verdict on December 20,
1977.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents ask the court to affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

STATE:.;ENT OF FACTS
Appellant John Price Associates,

Inc., is

engaged in the business of contracting, developing, and
leasing real estate owned by itself or affiliates

(R.267)

Respondent Robert P. Morris is a real estate
salesman who was employed by Gump & Ayers Real Estate,
Inc., from October of 1974 to October of 1976
Respondent Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc.,
broker (R.223).

(R.l96).

is a real estate

At all times pertinent to this case Morris

had a contract with Gump & Ayers under which he received
60% of any commissions he generated and Gump & Ayers received 40% (R.224).
Mr. Morris in addition to his activities as a
real estate salesman, had been, in 1972, attempting to
commercially develop property which he 01-med

(R.l98).

In

connection with this attempted development, Morris became
closely acquainted with representatives of IBM Corporation.
In particular, Morris established business
with:

rclation~hips

Vern Swenson, IBM's head of real estate for the

western United States

(R.l97); John Lind

~ho

was Mr.

Swenson's assistant (R.l97, 199); and Chuc}: 1:/oodwCJnl who
was sales manager for I3'·!'s Sa]t LJK(' ofricc· (H.J9G).

f·!r.

Swenson and Mr. Lind worked in the Lo:; Anr;cdcs, Californiil
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IBN office (R.l97).

Although 1·1orris' own land development

did not come to fruition

(R.l98), he did become very familiar

with the real estate and office space needs of IBM (R.l99).
In the fall of 1974 Morris became aware that
appellant's Meridian Park Office Building #2 would be available for leasing (R.200), and believed that the building
would meet the needs of IBH (R.216, 217).

On or about

January 29, 1975, Morris called John Price, president of
John Price Associates, Inc., and told him that he could
get IBM as a tenant for the Meridian Park Development
(R.201).

Nr. Price, whom Morris had known for approxi-

mately 15 years

(R.200), told Morris that if he would come

down to appellant's offices, Nr. Price would direct Gary
Machan, a vice-president of appellant, to provide Norris
with a copy of the plans of the Heridian Park complex and
a letter assuring Morris of a commission if IBM leased the
building (R. 201).
Morris proceeded to appellant's offices on the
afternoon of January 29, 1975, and obtained the commission
letter and set of plans (R.203).

The commission letter,

which was addressed to Morris, stated:
This letter is to assure you that we will
cover you on a 6% commission if a successful lease is negotiated with IBM on the
second building of the Meridian Park Office
Building.
The letter was signed by Gary Machan, vice-president of
John Price Associates, Inc., in charge of real estate
(H. 204) .

Immediately aft:er obtaining the above materials,
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Morris flew to Los Angeles and on January 30, 1975, presented
the plans and a letter describing the building complex to
Mr. Swenson (R.205).

Morris took Swenson to lunch and ex-

plained to Swenson that he believed the Meridian Park complex
was the only one that would suit the needs of IBM, in Salt
Lake City (R.205, 206).
Up to January 30, 1975, no one at John Price
Associates, Inc., was aware of the particular needs of IBM
in Salt Lake City (R.287, 253, 254).
and after the January 30th

meetin~

However, both before

IBM was involved in a

continuous search for new office space in Salt Lake City
(R.308, 323), and Mr. Swenson testified that Morris was
aware, from their conversations, of the needs of IBM in
Salt Lake City (R.325, 326).

Thus, Morris was able to

match IBM's desire to lease a "shell space" structure with
the fact that the Meridian Park building satisifed such a
requirement (R.309, 216, 217).
In addition to the plans furnished to IBM at
the January 30th meeting with Mr. Swenson,

~lorris

also

presented space estimates on the Meridian Park building.
The estimates were based on Morris' phone conversation
with John Price (R. 217, 282).

Morris left the building

plans with Mr. Swenson and flew back to Salt Lake City
(R. 206).

On February 4, 1975, John Lind, an assistant

of Mr. Swenson, phoned Mr. ~1achan at John Price Associates,
Inc.

(R.362).

The call carne at the request of Mr. Swenson
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and the purpose of the call, as evidenced by Lind's notes,
was to obtain more

infor~ation

about the Meridian Park

building (R.206).
After the meeting v;i th

~!r.

Swenson in Los Angeles,

Morris kept informed of the activities of IBM through his
contact with Mr. Chuck

\~ood•,,ard,

in Salt Lake City (R. 207, 209).

the sales manager for IBM
\~oodward

was able to supply

Morris with information since local IBM employees are involved in an advisory capacity in the search for new office
space

(R.329).

Morris continued to state to Woodward the

advantages of the Meridian Park complex (R.208).
Around September of 1975 John Lind was replaced
by Ray Zimmerman

(R.305, 306).

Lind discussed IBM's need

for office space in Salt Lake City with Zimmerman (R.355).
Zimmerman saw the letter from

~:orris

to Vern Swenson which

also contained Lind's notes from his February 4, 1975, phone
conversation with Machan of John Price Associates

(R.312).

Lind testified that IBM had more than a routine interest in
the letter from Morris since the typical unsolicited letter
received by IBM, relating to real estate opportunities, would
be returned to the sender or a reply letter would be written.
In this case neither of those procedures was followed by IBM
(R. 364, 365) .
That same month

\~oodward,

the Iml sales manager

for Salt Lake, called the offices of the appellant and
arranged for a meeting which took place later on the same
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day between appellant and IBM (R.254, 255).

After that

point in time all negotiations leading to the signing of
the lease agreement were handled by the real estate departments of IBM and John Price Associates, Inc. (R.238).

In

March of 1976 Mr. Morris learned through his IBM contacts
that the lease would probably be signed (R.210).

He

called Machan and requested his commission, which request
was refused and the resulting la1vsuit ensued (R. 210).

ARGUHENT
I.

THE JURY VERDICT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED SINCE NO
SUBSTANTIAL OR PREJUDICIAL ERROR OCCURRED
Appellant in its Statements of Fact continues to
argue facts that were resolved at trial.

Such argument,

however, is subject to the fundamental rule often reiterated by this court:
This case falls within the framework
of the fundamental principle:
that what
the parties are entitled to is a fair opportunity to present their respective cases to
a court and jury for determination.
When
this has been accomplished, ~esumptions
favor the verity of the verdict and the judgment; and this includes all aspects of the
conduct of the proceedings, and rulings of
the court. The burden is up~Cl~
to show not only that there was error, but
that it was substantial and ~dicial .
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake!Clty-v.
Mitsui Investment Inc., 522 P.2d 1370,
1374 (Utah 1974) (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added) .
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Further, this court has clarified the above rule
by stating that "where the evidence is in dispute it must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict . .
Whyte v. Christensen, 550 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 1976)
added).

(emphasis

See also, Isaguirre v. Echevarria, 96 Idaho 641,

534 P.2d 471 (1975), where the Idaho Supreme Court in a real
estate broker's commission case summarized the general rule
that "[t)he findings of fact of a trial court will not be
disturbed on appeal when based on substantial competent,
though conflicting, evidence."

Id. at 475 (emphasis added).

Proceeding under the guidance of the above rule
it is only necessary to sketch the scenario that the jury
found persuasive.

Through his own, independent efforts

Morris became closely associated with certain key personnel
in IBM who were either directly or indirectly working on the
office space needs of IBM (R.l99), and matched those needs
with the specifications of the building being erected by
appellants (R.216, 217).

Morris promptly communicated the

above information to Vern Swenson, IBM's head of real estate
for the western United States (R.l97).

Relying on the fact

that Morris was fully knowledgeable of IBM's needs, Swenson
instructed his assistant, John Lind, to call appellant and
obt"in further information (R.325, 326, 349, 362).

The

actions of Swenson and Lind were consistent with IBM's policy
of constantly searching for new office space necessary to
meet the company's anticipated growth (R.308, 323).
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When Lind was replaced by Ray

Zi~"erman,

Lind

informed Zimmerman of IBN's needs in Salt Lake City andrelayed the information on appellant's building (R.305, 306,
355).

Thereafter, Zimmerman contacted appellant through

Chuck Woodward, IBM sales manager for Salt Lake City (R.254,
255).

Woodward, with whoQ Morris had remained in constant

contact (R.207, 209), set up a meeting between Zimmerman and
appellant which launched the negotiations between the parties
eventually leading to the signing of the lease.
This reiteration of the facts clearly meets the
above test which was succinctly stated by the Kansas Supreme
Court in a broker's commission case:

"[T]he appellate questic-

is whether there is any evidence to sustain a finding that thE
efforts of the real estate broker were the procuring cause of
the sale."
559 (1971)

Holloway v. Forshee, 208 Kan. 258, 491 P.2d 556,
(emphasis added).

Thus, if there were evidence

to support the findings of fact in respondent's favor, there
may be no further review of the facts, but only of the legal
issues raised.

Simon v. Electrospace Corp., 28 N.Y. 2d 136,

269 N.E.2d 21, 320 N.Y.S. 2d 225, 227

(1971).

II.
THE JURY CORRECTLY FOUND RESPONDENTS TO BE THE
PROCURING CAUSE OF THE LEASE BETWEEN PRICE
AND IBM BASED ON PROPER INSTRUCTIONS
FROM THE TRIAL COURT
It is undisputable that in order for a real estate
agent to receive his commission he must be the procuring cause
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the sale.

In light of this rule of law, the trial

court gave the following Instruction No. 11:
To recover, plaintiffs must show by a
preponderance that they were the procuring
cause of the lease between IBH and defendant.
To be the procuring cause of the
lease, plaintiffs must have set a chain of
events in motion that finally resulted in
the lease.
If the events caused by the
plaintiffs' acts came to nothing, and the
lease was entered because of completely new
and independent causes, then plaintiffs cannot recover.
However, this does not mean
that plaintiffs must have participated at
every step of negotiations or even in most
of them.
Nor does it mean that plaintiffs
were not the procuring cause if others
would have set the same chain of events in
motion had plaintiffs not done so.
The trial court's instruction properly defined
the term "procuring cause" whether Horris is deemed to be
a "finder" or a "broker."

Therefore, the jury could properly

find that Harris' activities satisfied the test of "procuring
cause" under either theory.
Although there are no Utah cases on the distinction
between a "finder" and a "broker" the distinction is quite
narrow.

In Pennsylvania, the courts have described the

distinction as follows:

"Such distinction as exists between

these two terms is more a matter of trade usage than legal
definition.

In general, a finder is an independent actor

whose role is that of a middleman who introduces the parties,
supplies information to one or both about the other and is
Amerofina, Inc., v. U.S.

required to do little else.

Industries, Inc., 232 Pa. Super.Ct. 52, 325 A.2d 448, 451
(1975)

(emphasis added); Hinichiello v. Royal Business Funds
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(1966) cert. denied 389 U.S. 820 (1967).

The Pennsylvania

court, in awarding the plaintiff his commissions, held that
a finder must meet the test of procuring cause to earn his
commission, but wrote "it is clear that a finder's fee is
not dependent upon the finder's participation in negotiations
and that it may become payable even though a third person
brings the parties to an agreement."

325 A.2d at 453.

The Colorado Supreme Court has stated that a
"finder" is entitled to his commission if he "is the one
who sets the chain of events in motion which results in
the sale."

Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Roberts, 162

Col. 149, 425 P.2d 282, 286 (1967) and in Bittner v.
American Marietta Co., 162 F.Supp. 486, 488 (E.D. Ill.
1958), the Illinois district court held "[a]ll the 'finder'
is required to do is to bring the seller to the attention
of the purchaser."

In New York, the Court of Appeals has

held that: "It is possible for a finder to accomplish his
services by making only two phone calls and, if the parties
later conclude a deal, he is entitled to his commission."
Minichiello v. Royal Business Funds Corp., 18 N.Y. 2d 521,
223 N.E.2d 793, 277 N.Y.S.2d 268, 272 (1966) cert. denied
389 U.S. 820 (1967)

(emphasis added).

See also, Freeman v.

Jergins, 125 Cal. App. 2d 536, 271 P.2d 210, 219-220 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1954).
Clearly, Morris' activities passed all these
standards and Instruction No. 11 embodies the

Color~do
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Supreme Court's test which is actually

str~cter

than the

other standards.
The trial court's instruction

c~

procuring cause

also covered the possibility that respondent was acting in
the capacity of a "broker."

Appellant cor.te:1ds that the

facts do not support a finding that Mr. Mo=ris fulfilled
the obligations of a broker and that the

j~ry

instruction

on procuring cause for a broker was prejudicial to appellant.
It has been demonstrated, however, that :.!orris' actions
clearly were the basis for the lease between IBM and appellant.
An examination of the test for procuring cause for brokers will
show that Instruction No. 11 and the actions of Morris, both
meet the test.
Appellant cites Brooks v. Geo. Q. Cannon Ass'n,
53 Utah 304, 1978 P. 589 (1919) and states that it is very
similar to the case at bar.

Actually the facts of that

case are drastically different than the present appeal.
The Utah Supreme Court in Brooks stated:
After a careful perusal of the entire
transcript of the testimony in this case,
we are convinced there is not one scintilla
of evidence tending to show that the plaintiff
was the procuring cause in obtaining the loan
for the defendant.
. nor was she in the
slightest degree instrumental in br1nging
about the results finally obtained.
The testimony is clear and uncontradicted
that the only effort made by the [agent].
was that she.
. communicated ·.-~ith either
the Chicago or New York branch office of
the Travelers' Insurance Company .
Had either of these offices referred their
communications to either the seneral office
at Hartford or the local agency at Salt Lake
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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city, the plaintiff's claim of having procured the loan might be contended for with
some degree of consistency.
. Absolutely
nothing resulted from plaintiff's inefficient
efforts and attempt to procure the loan,
as we view the record.
Id. at 591 (emphasis
added) .
Clearly, the court was justified in reversing the
jury verdict in Brooks where the plaintiff could not produce
"one scintilla of evidence" to support her claim under the
procuring cause test, but it is equally as clear that in
the case at bar, respondents' actions were the only logical
explanation of how the lease was procured.

Appellant continue;

on Page 12 of its brief, to advance unsubstantiated theories
of how the lease might have been procured.

Appellant specu-

lates that employees of John Price may have contacted IBM,
or an unsolicited mailing may have attracted the attention
of IBM,or Mr. Zimmerman may have discovered the Meridian
Park building through an "independent effort."

However,

Price failed to advance any evidence substantiating these
theories and the jury chose not to believe such speculation,
but rather the plausible explanation advanced by Morris.
Other cases cited by appellant are also distinguishable from the present one.

In Hampton Park Corp. v.

T. D. Burgess Co., Inc., 270 Md. 269, 311 A.2d 35

(1973), the

broker's contract required that the land be sold by the

brok~

and thus the broker had to participate in negotiations in
that case.

Id. at 423.

In Reed v. Taylor, 78 Wyo.

216, 322

P.2d 147 (1958) and Link v. Patrick, 367 P. 2d 157 (Alaska 1961
the efforts of one broker were superceded by the efforts of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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another broker and thus the former broker could not be the
procuring cause of the sale.

Appellant cites the case of

Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680
(1943) , where Justice Wolfe stated an evidentiary rule applicable in proximate cause-negligence cases.

Even if such a

standard were held applicable to the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the actions of Morris and the ensuing
activities of IBM were not "conjecture" and Price failed to
prove any "equal or more potent" probabilities.

Id. at 683.

In contrast to the inapposite examples cited by
appellant is the clear holding of the Utah Supreme Court in
Fredrick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266
(1962).

The court stated:
[T)he extent to which the broker's
efforts must induce the sale depends on
the terms used in the contract and the
understanding and intention of the parties
in making such agreement and the facts and
circumstances of the case.
Usually, whether
the broker first approaches, or brings to the
attention of the buyer that the property is
for sale, or brings the buyer into the
picture, has considerable weight in determining whether the buyer is the procuring
cause of the sale. The fact that the sale
was consumated without participation by
the broker in the final negotiation does
not preclude him from recovering his commission if the sale was otherwise procured
by him.
Id. at 269 (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis-added).

See also, Isaguirre v. Echevarria, 96 Idaho 641, 534 P.2d
471, 475 (1975).
Expanding upon the general rule stated above,
the Kansas Supreme Court held ''[w)here a real estate agent
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is employed to find a purchaser ready, able, and Hilling to
buy on terms acceptable to the seller, it is not required,
in order to earn his commission, that he bring the parties
together personally or introduce them, nor is it the laiV
that, in order to earn his commission, he must procure a
binding contract signed by the purchaser."

HolloHay v.

Forshee, 208 Kan. 258, 491 P. 2d 556, 559 ( 1971)
in original).

(emphasis

See also, Hueller v. Seefried, 54

345 P.2d 389, 391 (1959).

\~ash.

79,

Thus, contra to appellant's

contention on Page 12 of its brief, it is not necessary
that the agent deal with representatives 1-1ho are formally
"authorized" to procure the lease.

The agent need only

"bring to the attention of the buyer that the property is
for sale."

See Fredrick May & Co. v. Dunn, supra,

368 P.2d

at 269.
The New Mexico Supreme Court has observed that
"[t)o entitle a real estate broker to compensation, it
is sufficient that a sale is effected through his agency
as its procuring cause . . . although the broker docs
negotiate and is not present at the sale."
50 N.M. 121, 171 P.2d 647, 649

(1946)

in Summers v. Freeman, 128 Cal. App.

~ot

Wilson v. Sewell,

(emphasis added).

Also,

2d 828, 276 P.2d 131

(Dist. Ct. App. 1954), the California court held:

"Where a

broker's employment agreement does not contemplate that he
shall procure a customer on certain terms, he is net obliged
to bring the minds of the principa1_<l':l_d_ the custom'?_r __ t~-~
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agreement.

He earns his commission when he procures a

customer on terms to be arranged with the principal."
Id. at 134 (emphasis added).

Both appellant and IBM had

their own real estate departments (R.238), and as the
evidence indicates they negotiated a complex lease.

This,

however, in no way negates the fact that Morris was instrumental in bringing the two parties together and beyond that,
the letter agreement did not require Morris to procure a
lessee on "certain terms."
Finally, appellant claims on Pages 12 and 13 of
its brief that the 18-month period between Harris' presentation to 1'\r. Swenson and signing of the lease somehow
undermines respondents' argument under the procuring cause
test.

At the outset it should be restated that the day after

Morris received his commission letter from appellant, he
traveled to Los Angeles and presented the pertinent information concerning the 1'\eridian Park building to Mr. Swenson
(R. 205).

Further, at a later date, !'\orris showed the out-

side of the building to Mr. Swenson when he was in Salt Lake
City and !'\orris kept in constant contact with Mr. Woodward
(R. 206, 207, 209).

When confronted with the issue of

whether an elapse of time would cause a revocation of a
broker's contract, the New Nexico Supreme Court stated:
"[W]herc a broker find6 a purchaser at the seller's terms,
while still employed,

!:~reasonableness

~~-~Ci~; ta };£[1_ i_2___:l_~~ l EC!J:a l. "

194 P. 2d 266, 270

(1948)

of the time which

Erb. -~~_Halvk s,

(citiltions omitted)

52 N. M. 16 6,
(emphasis
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added).

See also, Equity Benefit Life Insurance Co. v.

Trent, 566 P.2d 449, 454 {Okla. 1977).

The cJew York

court of Appeals summed up a strikingly similar fact
situation by stating:
"Tracing a connection between plaintiff's introduction of the business and the
termination of the entire transaction was for
the jury's consideration. .
Here there was
a time lapse of about eighteen months between
the first Robosonic's meeting and the reactivation of the deal by Toxin's call to the new
president.
Tracing a connection between the
two is supported by the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom and is
not to be rejected because of the intervening
lapse of time.
Enough has been stated to indicate that
the evidence, albeit contradicted, also sufficed
to establish a continuing connection between
plaintiff's initial efforts and the merger
that carne about.
The issue, therefore, on
this score, is beyond review in this court.
Simon v. Electrospace Corp., 28 N.Y.2d 136,
269 N.E. 2d 21, 320 N.Y.S.2d 225, 229 {1971)
{emphasis added) .

III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST ROBERT P.
MORRIS ON THE GROUND THAT HE WAS AN H!PROPER
PARTY TO THE ACTION
Appellant cites Utah Code Ann.

§§

61-2-2,-18

and argues that Robert P. Morris is not a proper party to
the lawsuit.

The evidence shows, however, that the agree-

rnent between Gurnp & Ayers, a registered

r~al

estate broker

(R.223), and Mr. Morris, a real estate salesman {R.l96),
provided that Morris was to receive 60% of all con®issions
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he earned and Gump

&

Ayers \·las to receive 40% (R. 224).

For Gump & Ayers to prove their cause of action (for 40%),
Morris is a necessary party to the lawsuit.
and 20 of the U.R.C.P.)

(See Rule 19

The Utah Supreme Court stated in

Young v. Buchanan, 123 Utah 369, 259 P.2d 876, 878-79 (1953),
"Rule 19(a) does not permit one having no relationship or
interest whatsoever in the conflict between the warring parties
to be drawn into the fray merely because the real party in
interest, -- who is barred by statutory provision from
prosecuting the action in his own name and right, -- is in
need of such person to circuMvent legislative mandate."
(Emphasis added.)

That obviously is not the case in the

present appeal and the statute should not be construed to
prohibit real and necessary parties in interest from being
joined in a cause of action.
In addition, a favorable ruling for appellant
on this issue seems meaningless since the trial would have
proceeded in the same manner without Morris.

The same testi-

mony would have been received and there is no evidence the
jury verdict would have been otherwise had Morris not been
a named party.

CONCLUSIO:.J
The evidence clearly indicates that the commission
earned by respondents was was justified and that Morris was the
procuring cause of the lease.

~lorris

spent more than three years
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becoming acquainted with the needs of IBM and spent the
same period cultivating personal relationships with
employees of IBM.

Particularly important was Morris'

relationship with Mr. Vern Swenson, IBM's head of real
estate for the western United States.

Mr. Morris was

able to quickly reach the one person who had responsibility
for all of IBM's real estate matters in the Salt Lake area.
Morris' perceptive matching of the needs of IBM with the
attributes of the Price building provided the crucial link
between appellant and IBM.

Finally, the jury had the

opportunity to consider all of the evidence and they found
Morris' activity was the basis for the lease.
For the above reasons the verdict of the jury
and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GELD ZAHLER

& Ayers
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed tHo (2) copies,
postage prepaid, of the foregoing Brief of Respondents to
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